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Changes between Version 1 and Version 2 of SecurityAnnouncement-FREAK

-                      v1
+                      v2
 * OpenVPN's tls-auth feature prevents this attack
 * Adding ''!EXP'' to the server side tls-cipher is enough to mitigate attacks. The suggested tls-cipher string is ''DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW:!PSK:!SRP:!kRSA''. This disallows export ciphers, weak ciphers (e.g. DES), and RSA key exchange (note: not RSA authentication), but allows any future, stronger cipher suites.
 * Clients who wish to rule out this attack before next week can add ''!kRSA'' to their tls-cipher
 * An attacker requires a man-in-the-middle position
 * An attacker has to invest time (~7.5 hrs) and money (~$100) per OpenVPN instance (restart) to attack a connection, which makes this relevant for targeted attacks only.
+* Clients who wish to rule out this attack on clients prior to 2.3.6-I002/I603 can add ''!kRSA'' to their tls-cipher string
+* An attacker requires a man-in-the-middle position.
+* An attacker has to invest time and money per OpenVPN instance (restart) to attack a connection, which makes this relevant for targeted attacks only.
 * OpenVPN always provides PFS with its own key exchange mechanism, making it impossible to decrypt sessions prior to a successful factorization of the temporary export key, even if those connections already used an RSA_EXPORT cipher.